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Theorists have proposed that core Cognitive Therapy skills, such as reappraising negative 
thoughts, are useful not only for recovering from depression but also for staying well years after 
recovery. However, surprisingly little empirical work has tested (1) whether CT skills are used 
years after therapy, (2) whether continued CT skill use is associated with mood benefits, and (3) 
whether continued CT skill use involves significant effort and emotional engagement. To address 
these issues, we measured frequency of CT skill use in former CT patients, and we tested the 
association between CT skill use and adaptive mood outcomes as well as the association between 
CT skill use and engagement with dysfunctional thoughts, as indexed via pupil dilation. 
Twenty-two formerly depressed individuals aged 24-70 who responded to research-
protocol CT 2-6 years ago completed the Skills of Cognitive Therapy – Patient (SoCT-P) self-
report measure and underwent two experimental blocks in which a sad mood induction was 
provided and then pupil dilation was measured during self-paced presentation of self-relevant 
dysfunctional statements. During the first block, participants were asked to cope however they 
normally would, while in the second block, participants were asked to reappraise each statement. 
We examined (1) mean SoCT-P, (2) correlations between SoCT-P and adaptive mood outcomes 
HOW ARE COGNITIVE THERAPY SKILLS USED (OR NOT USED) YEARS 
AFTER TREATMENT? 
SUBJECTIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES 
Benjamin Sajowitz Paul, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
 
 v 
(lack of cognitive reactivity and transience of induced sadness), and (3) the correlation between 
SoCT-P and pupil dilation in response to dysfunctional statements. 
Results indicated that, on average, participants reported using CT skills between “half” 
and “most” of the time. SoCT-P was non-significantly associated with adaptive mood outcomes, 
with moderate effect sizes. In the first block, SoCT-P was negatively correlated with pupil 
dilation during the period immediately before and after presentation of each statement. 
This study provides the first evidence that CT skills are still used years after therapy. 
More power is needed to test whether continued CT skill use is associated with positive mood 
outcomes, although results were in the predicted direction. Finally, as CT skill use was 
negatively correlated with an index of cognitive and emotional load, results may argue against 
the notion that continued CT skill use involves deployment of effortful compensatory strategies. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
It is often suggested that the skills taught in Cognitive Therapy for depression (CT) are important 
long after patients have recovered from depression. In particular, some have proposed that 
patients who respond to CT will continue to use and benefit from the skills they learned even 
after completing therapy (A. T. Beck, 1979; R. J. DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon, 2008; Hollon, 
2003; Hollon, Stewart, & Strunk, 2006; R. B. Jarrett & Kraft, 1997). Under this perspective, core 
CT skills, such as reappraising negative thoughts, are useful not only for recovering from mental 
illness but also for staying well after recovery. Yet surprisingly little empirical work has tested 
this perspective. A better understanding of post-acute use of CT skills is important for (1) 
determining whether the same skills that are useful in recovering from depression with CT are 
also important for maintaining euthymic mood after CT, and (2) our knowledge of how former 
CT patients use their skills, i.e., whether such individuals automatically process negative stimuli 
in an adaptive manner or whether significant effort and emotional engagement is involved to 
counter stable negative information processing tendencies. The current study sought to fill these 
gaps by investigating the use, usefulness, and effort involved in deploying a skill thought to be 
particularly important in CT (A. T. Beck, 1979), cognitive reappraisal of negative thoughts.  
Cognitive reappraisal, i.e., changing the emotional impact of a stimulus by changing 
one's mental interpretation of that stimulus (Gross & John, 2003), is generally an effective 
strategy to down-regulate negative affect. This has been evidenced by a growing body of 
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research indicating that instructing participants to change their interpretation of negative stimuli 
results in less negative affect compared to control conditions (Gross, 1998; Hofmann, Heering, 
Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009; Oliveira, 2008; Teasdale & Fennell, 1982; L. E. Williams, Bargh, 
Nocera, & Gray, 2009). Further evidence comes from findings that individuals who report 
frequent cognitive reappraisal also report better mental health and respond more adaptively to 
stressors (Gross & John, 2003; Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007; Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 
2006; L. E. Williams et al., 2009). 
Yet depressed individuals are deficient in their use of this beneficial strategy. Depressed 
individuals report using this skill to a lesser extent than healthy controls (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010; S. A. Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008; Siegle, P. M. Moore, & Thase, 2004), and 
depressive symptomatology is negatively correlated with use of reappraisal (Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). 
Therefore, one would expect that depressed individuals would benefit from learning to 
reappraise negative thoughts more frequently. Indeed, CT patients who receive more training in 
cognitive skills such as reappraisal do experience greater symptom improvement (Strunk, 
Brotman, & R. J. DeRubeis, 2010), suggesting that learning cognitive skills is beneficial for 
depressed individuals. In line with this interpretation, individuals who report greater CT skill use 
at therapy mid-point are more likely to achieve therapy response by the end of acute treatment 
(R. B. Jarrett, Vittengl, L. A. Clark, & Thase, 2011), underscoring the potential role that CT 
skills may play in recovery from depression. Furthermore, decrease in dysfunctional thinking 
during CT, which may be related to increasing reappraisal of dysfunctional thoughts, is 
predictive of subsequent decline in depressive symptoms (R. J. DeRubeis et al., 1990). The 
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evidence suggests that learning to reappraise more frequently during CT is generally beneficial 
for depressed individuals. 
Thus, teaching cognitive reappraisal in CT appears to be associated with increased use of 
this skill, which is in turn associated with less negative mood. However, surprisingly little 
research has directly tested whether individuals continue to make use of CT skills and whether 
continued skill use would be beneficial at maintaining therapy gains. 
Initial data concerning frequency of CT skill use following therapy comes from a small 
qualitative study (Glasman, Finlay, & Brock, 2004). Nine individuals who had responded to 
community-delivered therapy described as cognitive-behavioral in nature, were administered a 
semi-structured interview within ten months of therapy completion. Eight of nine individuals 
(89%) reported that they still reappraise automatic negative thoughts as they learned to do in CT, 
while the other individual reported that CT techniques were never relevant to him. Thus, initial 
small-scale data would predict that post-therapy use of CT skills is fairly common. 
Although no research has examined CT skill use longer than ten months after therapy 
completion, data from another form of psychotherapy may suggest that skill use substantially 
declines years after treatment. For instance, in a form of psychotherapy that encourages practice 
of silent meditation several times a week, approximately 90% of individuals report frequent 
practice at the end of treatment, and 60% continue frequent practice six months after treatment 
completion, but by four years post-treatment only 30% continue to meditate frequently. Even the 
30% figure is inflated by frequent use of add-on meditation programs after acute treatment 
completion (Bondolfi et al., 2010; J. J. Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995; Reibel, Greeson, 
Brainard, & Rosenzweig, 2001) Based on this evidence, we hypothesized that CT skill use would 
significantly decline but not cease completely following treatment termination. 
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However, it is important to investigate not only frequency of post-therapy skill use but 
also whether post-therapy skill use incurs benefits. Although a growing literature have 
demonstrated that CT skill use at therapy completion is predictive of lesser depressive 
symptomatology at follow-ups (Gibbons et al., 2009; Powers, Thompson, & Gallagher-
Thompson, 2008; Strunk, R. J. DeRubeis, Chiu, & Alvarez, 2007), it has not been empirically 
established that CT skill use after therapy remains important. Theoretically, Beck (1979) 
suggested that after patients complete therapy, they would continue to benefit from applying CT 
skills, such as reappraisal, to "the inevitable problems [they] will face" (p. 319). He even 
encouraged recovered patients to induce a negative mood so as to demonstrate that the CT 
techniques they had learned would effectively dissipate the mood. Jarrett and Kraft (1997) 
expanded on this notion by developing a system of Continuation CT that promotes continued 
practice and generalization of acute CT skills. In both cases, the investigators tacitly assume that 
the skills that are useful for recovering from depression are also useful for staying well following 
recovery.  
In fact, some preliminary support has recently emerged to bolster this assumption. In a 
survey of ninety older formerly depressed individuals who had responded to CBT eighteen 
months ago, those who continued to report few depressive symptoms also reported that CT skills 
were helpful to them (Powers et al., 2008). This suggests that individuals may at least attribute 
continued benefits to continued use of CT skills, if not actually benefit from them. Based on this 
evidence, as well as the aforementioned evidence that cognitive reappraisal is generally linked 
with adaptive mood outcomes (Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2009; Mauss 
et al., 2007, 2006; Oliveira, 2008; Teasdale & Fennell, 1982; L. E. Williams et al., 2009), we 
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hypothesized that continued CT skill use would be associated with adaptive mood outcomes 
years after CT. 
Benefits of continued CT skill use have also been discussed in literature concerning 
"enduring effects" of CT. In interpreting evidence that CT's positive effect on mood may endure 
even after treatment termination, Hollon (2003) hypothesized that continued skill use may play a 
causal role in this process. DeRubeis et al. (2008) elaborated a potential neural model of this 
theory, in which CT may teach patients to voluntarily activate prefrontal cortex to regulate 
negative emotions, and once patients learn this skill, they can continue to incur continued 
benefits by implementing it after therapy completion. 
Overall, a salutary effect of continued CT skill use has been assumed by some, 
hypothesized by others, but rarely tested. Yet there have been some theoretical proposals that do 
not attribute beneficial effects to continued skill use per se. For example, Hollon et al. (2006) 
raised the possibility that deeper-level changes in core beliefs may be most responsible for 
enduring effects, rather than explicit skill deployment. In particular, initial CT skill use may lead 
to deeper-level changes in negative beliefs about the self, and it is the latter change that is 
proximally responsible for enduring gains (cf. Barber & R. J. DeRubeis, 1989). Indeed, there is 
some evidence that CT reduces negative elaborations about the self , potentially related to 
deactivation of core beliefs, rather than increasing explicit deployment of CT skills (Gibbons et 
al., 2009). This is consistent with evidence that after CT, knowledge about one's own core beliefs 
is a more powerful predictor of continued mood benefits than is identification and reappraisal of 
negative thoughts (Strunk et al., 2007). Thus, some accounts would hold that CT skills per se 
may not provide enduring benefits but that deep-level changes incurred by earlier use of CT 
skills may be responsible. 
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Aside from the questions of the use and usefulness of CT skills post-therapy, a final 
question concerns the effort and emotional engagement involved in deploying such skills. Some 
have suggested that after continued voluntary reappraisal of negative thoughts, the process 
becomes automatized such that it no longer requires significant effort (Barber & R. J. DeRubeis, 
1989; Hollon et al., 2006; Persons, 1993). Empirical evidence for this claim is scant, aside from a 
qualitative study that found that some individuals (n not given) describe continued use of CT 
skills as perpetual "hard work" while others report having internalized coping strategies to the 
point where hard work was no longer necessary (Glasman et al., 2004). Thus, the role of effort in 
CT skill use is somewhat ambiguous. However, non-psychotherapy studies have more 
extensively assessed the effort of implementing cognitive reappraisal. Such studies have 
consistently found that cognitive reappraisal involves significant effort and emotional 
engagement (Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; van Reekum et al., 2007; 
Urry et al., 2006). In line with this literature, we hypothesized that CT skill use would involve 
significant effort and emotional engagement.  
Thus, the current study investigates open questions regarding the use, usefulness, and 
degree of effort and emotional engagement involved in continued CT skill use. Our hypotheses 
were: (1) CT skills are still used years after therapy but to a lesser extent than at treatment 
completion, (2) CT skills are "useful," i.e., CT skill use will be positively associated with 
adaptive mood outcomes, and (3) CT skill use will involve significant effort and emotional 
engagement. 
Answering these questions may have large-scale implications. If former patients report 
that they generally do not use CT skills anymore, CT skills might not be relevant to their 
situation as recovered depressed individuals, and different techniques that work without negative 
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thoughts could be promoted for this time period, such as Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
(Teasdale et al., 2000). 
If those who continue to deploy CT skills are better able to deal with negative moods, 
then it may be useful to devise methods to keep patients motivated to deploy CT skills even 
when they are no longer feeling depressed. If not, responding to negative thoughts could be 
conceived of as analogous to an antibiotic that is helpful for acute illness but ineffective 
following the illness's resolution, and other techniques may be more relevant following CT 
completion. 
Finally, if CT skills are used, and if deploying such skills requires significant effort and 
emotional engagement, then it may be useful to devise methods to keep patients motivated to 
deploy arduous CT skills after treatment termination. If not, then therapists may consider 
extending therapy to the point where new information processing tendencies become 
automatized. 
To help address these issues, we conducted laboratory assessments on individuals who 
have previously responded to CT for depression. We examined frequency of CT skill use with 
the Skills of Cognitive Therapy – Patient (SoCT-P; R. B. Jarrett et al., 2011) self-report measure. 
We tested the level of effort and emotional engagement in CT skill users by presenting 
individuals with distressing sentences and assessing whether those who use CT skills had greater 
effort and emotional engagement than those who do not use CT skills. Effort and emotional 
engagement was indexed via pupil dilation, as the pupil reliably dilates when a task becomes 
more difficult, greater attention is brought online (Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992), or more intense 
emotional stimuli are presented (Steinhauer, Boller, Zubin, & Pearlman, 1983). Previous studies 
have used pupil dilation reliably to index effort and emotional engagement in a variety of tasks, 
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including reappraisal in healthy and depressed individuals (Johnstone et al., 2007; van Reekum 
et al., 2007; Urry et al., 2006), emotional processing in depression (Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & 
Matt, 2001; Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003; Siegle, Steinhauer, Stenger, 
Konecky, & Carter, 2003; Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002), and emotional 
processing in individuals at-risk for depression (Steidtmann, Ingram, & Siegle, 2010). 
To determine whether those who use CT skills are better able to deal with negative 
moods, we examined the relationship of self-reported skill use with laboratory measures of 
recovery from a sad mood and with change in dysfunctional attitudes following a mood 
induction ("cognitive reactivity"). This measure, which taps the ease to which dysfunctional 
attitudes become activated under stressful circumstances, can also be used as an analog for 
relapse risk (Z. V. Segal, Gemar, & S. Williams, 1999; Z. V. Segal et al., 2006), allowing us to 
assess whether CT skill use may be related to lower relapse vulnerability. 
As secondary goals, we tested whether CT skill use was associated with decreased 
viewing time of negative sentences, and whether engagement with negative thoughts is lower in 
those who have stayed well post-CT relative to those who have relapsed. 
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2.0  METHODS 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Former participants of a study of Cognitive Therapy for relapse prevention in depression 
(MH58356, MH58397; Thase, Jarrett, PIs; described below) and an ongoing study of response to 
CT for depression (MH074807; Siegle, PI; described below) comprised the subject pool for the 
present study. 
We sent letters and called individuals from these studies who had responded to CT within 
the last 2-6 years. This time frame was thought to be long enough to examine whether CT 
teaches enduring skills but short enough that participants could still remember learning those 
skills. 
Following Jarrett and Thase (2010), response was considered 17-item Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression (HRSD) <= 12 and absence of DSM-IV Major Depressive Episode (MDE) 
as rated by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & J. B. 
W. Williams, 1997). We excluded individuals who did not respond to CT because they are less 
likely to have gained CT skills at all (R. B. Jarrett et al., 2011) and therefore it would be difficult 
to interpret any subsequent reports of CT skill use. We chose to exclude individuals who met 
SCID (DSM-IV) criteria for current MDE at the time of the testing session because, as 
previously mentioned, our investigation concerns the use of CT skills during euthymic periods. 
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With one exception, we also excluded individuals experiencing any Axis I pathology, so that 
results would not be attributable to mental processes of other conditions. For instance, since 
intrusive recollections and dissociation occur more frequently in Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
than depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999), we considered these processes to be qualitatively 
different from processes involved in depression vulnerability and hence we excluded individuals 
who met criteria for PTSD. The one exception was that we chose to include an individual with 
Binge Eating Disorder that did not cause significant functional impairment and did not appear to 
play a prominent role in this participant's general emotional responding. 
Of the 102 individuals contacted, 22 participants (21.6%) were entered into the study (see 
CONSORT diagram, Figure 1). Thus, participants were 22 formerly depressed adults who had 
responded to research-protocol CT (described below) approximately 2-6 years ago (Table 1). All 
participants provided informed consent using forms approved by the University of Pittsburgh 
Institutional Review Board. 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics 
Characteristic Complete sample (n = 22) 
Female, n (%) 15 (68%) 
Years since Acute CT completion, M (SD), min-max 4.50 (1.10), 1.82-5.96 
Age, in years, M (SD), min-max 48.86 (12.02), 24-70 
Marital status, n (%)  
Single 12 (55%) 
Married or cohabiting 7 (32%) 
Separated, divorced, or widowed 3 (14%) 
Education, n (%)  
Graduated high school or high school equivalent 2 (9%) 
Part college 6 (27%) 
Graduated 2 year college 3 (14%) 
Graduated 4 year college 5 (23%) 
Part graduate/professional school 1 (5%) 
Completed graduate/professional school 5 (23%) 
Ethnicity, n (%)  
African-American 4 (18%) 
Caucasian 18 (82%) 
Current QIDS score (two missing), M (SD), min-max 2.65 (2.66), 0-10 
Current Axis I Diagnoses, n (%)  
Binge Eating Disorder 1 (5%) 
None 21 (95%) 
Current antidepressant medication, n (%) 3 (14%) 
Current psychotherapy/counseling, n (%) 3 (14%) 
Past MDEs  
(one missing, excluding six "too numerous or indistinct to count"), 
M (SD), min-max 3.4 (1.3), 2-6 
Previous Research-protocol Treatment, n (%)  
Acute CT 6 (27%) 
Acute CT + Cont. CT 6 (27%) 
Acute CT + Cont. Fluoxetine or Placebo 9 (41%) 
Experienced >= 1 relapse-recurrence following previous treatment 9 (41%) 
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2.2 PROCEDURE OVERVIEW 
First we describe an overview of the experimental procedure, before providing a complete 
description of study instruments and tasks. 
The first four participants completed the entire protocol in one day. As a result of 
feedback, the protocol was split into two sessions on separate days for all remaining participants 
(n = 18). In Session 1, participants were interviewed with the SCID to determine eligibility and 
they were interviewed with the Longitudinal Interval Follow-up Evaluation (LIFE) to assess 
relapse-recurrences since last research assessment. Participants completed the SoCT-P to 
describe their current CT skill use as well as a larger battery of self-report assessments. To 
prepare stimuli for Session 2, participants selected self-relevant dysfunctional statements from a 
pool of items, generated mood induction scripts, and practiced tasks (all described below). 
In Session 2, participants underwent two blocks in which a sad mood induction was 
provided and then pupil dilation was measured during presentation of self-relevant dysfunctional 
statements (Figure 2). During the first block ("Naturalistic Block"), participants were asked to 
imagine the statements as their own thoughts and to mentally deal with them in whatever way 
they normally would. Participants then completed a computerized CT refresher course in 
reappraising negative thoughts before undergoing the second block ("Reappraisal Block"). In this 
block, participants were asked to provide cognitive reappraisals for each thought according to the 
guidelines of the refresher course. The experiment concluded with a positive mood induction to 
aid return to a euthymic state. 
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Figure 1. CONSORT chart: participant flow from initial contact to study participation 
Established contact (n=63) 
Entered in study (n=22) 
Responded to Acute CT within 
last 2-6 years (n=102) 
Included in SoCT-P analysis 
(n=22) 
Included in mood induction 
analysis (n=19) 
Included in mood-recovery 
analysis and Naturalistic pupil 
analysis (n=18) 
Analysis 
Enrollment 
Excluded (n=39) 
Outdated contact information or did not 
respond to contact attempts (n=39) 
Excluded  (n=41) 
♦   Declined to participate (n=25) 
♦   Did not meet inclusion criteria (n=11) 
♦   Still active (n=4) 
♦   Completed after cut-off date (n=1) 
Excluded  (n=3) 
♦   Did not return for Session 2 (n=2) 
♦   Fell asleep during Session 2 (n=1) 
Excluded because not sad after mood 
induction (n=1) 
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3.0  DESIGN 
3.1 INSTRUMENTS 
3.1.1 Instruments for screening 
3.1.1.1 Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders (SCID) 
The SCID (First et al., 1997) was used to screen out individuals currently meeting criteria 
for any major Axis I diagnosis, including Major Depressive Disorder. The SCID-I has 
demonstrated inter-rater reliability ranging from .57 to 1.0, with Major Depressive Disorder 
demonstrating a reliability of .80 (Zanarini et al., 2000). In terms of 7-10 day test-retest 
reliability, the SCID-I has demonstrated reliability ranging from .35 to .78, with Major 
Depressive Disorder demonstrating a reliability of .61. Miller et al. (2001) found that the SCID-I 
had greater convergence than an unstructured interview with a best estimate diagnosis 
established by expert diagnosticians using all data available, including longitudinal data. In the 
current study, all diagnoses were made by the first author after receiving SCID training. 
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3.1.2 Instruments for CT skill use 
3.1.2.1 Skills of Cognitive Therapy – Patient Version (SoCT-P) 
The SoCT-P (R. B. Jarrett et al., 2011) is an eight-item self-report measure that assesses 
understanding and use of principles and skills that are taught in CT, over the last month. 
Responses range from 1 ("never") to 5 ("always or when needed"). The measure has 
demonstrated good internal consistency, correlation with observer version, and predictive 
validity. Two items appear to tap cognitive reappraisal of negative thoughts: "I looked for 
alternative explanations when I had negative thoughts" and "I weighed the evidence for and 
against negative thoughts" while other items may tap reappraisal more indirectly, e.g., "I 
identified automatic negative thoughts and completed thought logs" and "I tested negative 
automatic thoughts or beliefs by setting up experiments." In the current study, we conducted 
sensitivity analyses that used only the two clearly reappraisal-relevant items. 
3.1.3 Instruments used in stimulus generation 
3.1.3.1 Sad mood scripts 
To provide stimuli for the two negative mood inductions, participants composed two 
vignettes describing extremely sad times in their lives involving significant guilt (refer to 
Instructions to generate memories for sad mood inductions). We asked for memories involving 
not only sadness but also guilt, so as to increase salience of dysfunctional thoughts that may 
warrant deployment of CT skills. This allowed us to rule out sad events that might not activate 
dysfunctional thoughts, such as the death of a pet. Each mood induction used a different sad 
script, to ensure that the emotional impact of a memory would not be blunted upon repetition. 
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3.1.3.2 Sad music selections 
The combination of reliving a sad autobiographical memory and listening to sad music 
has been recommended as more effective than just one or the other (Eich, Ng, Macaulay, Percy, 
& Grebneva, 2007). Sad music and sad memory recall has been found to be effective at inducing 
transient sad moods (D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Z. V. Segal et al., 1999, e.g., 2006). To 
provide stimuli for the two negative mood inductions, two pieces of sad music were 
idiosyncratically chosen from several possible musical selections (refer to Musical selections for 
sad mood induction). A widely used negative mood induction is the orchestral piece, "Russia 
under the Mongolian Yoke," played at half-speed (D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1985). Consistent 
with recent recommendations (Kreutz, Ott, Teichmann, Osawa, & Vaitl, 2008) and results from 
our laboratory's pilot testing, we allowed participants to preview several instrumental pieces of 
music used in a previous study (Gemar, Kapur, Z. V. Segal, G. M. Brown, & Houle, 1996) and 
to choose the pieces that would be most effective at inducing a sad mood. Each mood induction 
used a different sad script, to ensure that the emotional impact of a memory would not be blunted 
upon repetition. 
3.1.3.3 Happy music selections 
To provide stimuli for the positive mood induction, one piece of music was 
idiosyncratically chosen from several possible musical selections (refer to Musical selections for 
happy mood induction). Consistent with recent recommendations (Kreutz et al., 2008) and 
results from our pilot testing, we allowed participants to listen to preview several instrumental 
pieces of music and to choose the piece that would be most effective at inducing a happy mood. 
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3.1.3.4 Inventories of dysfunctional thoughts 
In order to present only self-relevant stimuli, participants idiosyncratically selected the 
most distressing negative statements from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, Crandell 
Cognitions Inventory, and the Depression subscale of the Cognitions Checklist. In particular, 
participants were asked to imagine themselves in a sad mood and to rate how much sadder each 
thought would make them feel, on a scale from 1 ("no more sad") to 5 ("extremely more sad") 
(Instructions to select self-relevant dysfunctional thoughts). We asked participants to make 
ratings while imagining a sad mood because previous studies have demonstrated that recovered 
depressed individuals generally find few thoughts to be distressing while in their typical mood 
state (Z. V. Segal & Ingram, 1994). The 30 most personally distressing statements for each 
participant were randomly split into two non-overlapping subsets of 15 statements. Each 
experimental block (described below) used one of the two subsets, to ensure that the emotional 
impact of the statements would not be lessened upon repetition. 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) 
The ATQ (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a self-report measure that assesses frequency of 30 
negative self-statements. The ATQ has demonstrated high internal reliability, with Cronbach 
alpha ranging from .89-.97, as well as convergent validity with the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Harrell & Ryon, 1983; Hollon & Kendall, 1980). Depressed outpatients receive higher scores on 
this measure than healthy controls and psychiatric controls (Harrell & Ryon, 1983; Hollon, 
Kendall, & Lumry, 1986), and the measure has also demonstrated sensitivity to treatment effects 
(Garratt, Ingram, Rand, & Sawalani, 2007; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). Sample items 
are "I hate myself" and ‘‘I’m a failure." 
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Crandell Cognitions Inventory (CCI) 
The CCI (Crandell & Chambless, 1986) is a self-report measure that assesses frequency 
of 45 negative thoughts associated with depression. The CCI assesses four categories of 
cognitions, corresponding to Beck's categories of cognitive distortions involving detachment, 
inferiority, helplessness, and hopelessness. The scale has demonstrated internal consistency with 
Cronbach alpha of .95 and convergent validity with the Beck Depression Inventory, as well as 
the ability to discriminate between depressed patients, psychiatric controls, and healthy controls. 
Sample items are "I'm always letting myself down" and "I mess everything up." 
Depression subscale of Cognitions Checklist (CCL-D) 
The CCL-D (A. T. Beck, G. Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987) is a 14-item scale 
assessing frequency of depressotypic cognitions. It has demonstrated high internal consistency 
with a Cronbach alpha of .90-.92 along with good convergent validity with the Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression and the Beck Depression Inventory. Discriminant validity has been 
demonstrated against the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (A. T. 
Beck et al., 1987; Steer, A. T. Beck, D. A. Clark, & J. S. Beck, 1994). Sample items are "I will 
never overcome my problems" and "Nothing ever works out for me anymore." 
3.1.4 Instruments used in the experimental procedure 
3.1.4.1 Sad mood induction 
Before presentation of dysfunctional statements, participants underwent a seven-minute 
negative mood induction in which they were asked to relive a sad autobiographical memory 
 19 
involving significant guilt while listening to idiographically selected sad music (see above). 
Participants completed the induction alone in a dimly lit room. 
3.1.4.2 Sadness Scale of Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Extended Form (PANAS-
SAD) 
Before and after presentation of dysfunctional statements, participants rated their current 
emotional state with the PANAS-SAD (Watson & L. A. Clark, 1999). Participants rated the 
extent to which they were feeling "sad," "blue," "downhearted," "alone," and "lonely," with 
responses ranging from 1 ("very slightly or not at all") to 5 ("extremely"). The PANAS sadness 
scale has demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach alpha = 0.87), good convergent 
validity with the Profile of Mood States (r = 0.85), and good construct validity as demonstrated 
by convergence between self and peer ratings. 
3.1.4.3 Task-related Challenging 
To verify that participants high in self-reported CT skill use actually challenged negative 
thoughts during laboratory tasks, participants were asked to complete a novel measure of task-
related challenging negative thoughts. After viewing the negative statements, participants rated 
the frequency with which they reappraised those statements in a manner endorsed by Cognitive 
Therapy theorists. Six items were presented, four of which were adapted from descriptions found 
in "Mind Over Mood" (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995), and two of which were items from the 
SoCT-P as adapted for the current study. Sample items are, "How often did you think the 
sentences were too extreme to be true?" and "How often did you weigh the evidence for and 
against the sentences?" Responses ranged from 1 ("not at all") to 5 ("almost always"). 
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3.1.4.4 Training in Challenging Negative Thoughts 
To retrain all participants to reappraise negative thoughts, we used the first module of a 
computerized CT program that has shown efficacy at increasing CT knowledge and reducing 
depression (“Good Days Ahead”; J. H. Wright et al., 2005). Efficacy has been demonstrated in a 
randomized controlled trial in which computerized CT ameliorated depression to an equivalent 
extent as standard CT and superior to a wait-list control. Acquisition of CT knowledge was 
superior in computerized CT compared to both wait-list control and standard CT (J. H. Wright et 
al., 2005). In the current study, participants completed the first module ("Basic Principles") in 
approximately 30-40 minutes. The module uses video vignettes to illustrate negative thoughts, 
positive thoughts, the relationship of cognitions with emotions and behavior, and the process of 
"making positive changes to your thinking," i.e., reappraising negative thoughts. Participants 
were guided through completion of all homework assignments in the module. In these 
assignments, participants identified self-relevant negative and positive thoughts and then 
completed simplified thought records in which they provided reappraisals for the negative 
thoughts. Study personnel provided corrective feedback for any reappraisals that did not 
acknowledge the original thought and provide a response that was more positive or realistic. 
3.1.4.5 Positive mood induction 
To aid participants’ return to a euthymic state, the experiment concluded with a positive 
mood induction, using 3-7 minutes of positive, ideographically selected music (see above) paired 
with recollection of a happy autobiographical memory (refer to Instructions to generate memory 
for happy mood induction). 
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3.1.5 Instruments used in secondary analyses 
3.1.5.1 The Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (QIDS) 
The QIDS was used to assess whether current results were confounded by current level of 
residual depressive symptomatology. This 16-item self-report measure has demonstrated high 
internal consistency with Cronbach alpha of .87 and good convergent validity with interviewer-
rated measures of depressive symptomatology (Rush et al., 2006). 
3.1.5.2 Longitudinal Interval Follow-up Evaluation (LIFE) 
Data from the LIFE (Keller et al., 1987) were used in secondary analyses involving post-
acute-CT relapse. The LIFE is a widely used semi-structured interview used to assess the 
longitudinal course of DSM-IV psychiatric disorders. It has demonstrated inter-rater intraclass 
correlation of .86-.88 for time to relapse-recurrence, and long-term test-retest reliability of 
approximately .6 for MDD (Keller et al., 1987; Warshaw, Dyck, Allsworth, Stout, & Keller, 
2001). In the current study, all diagnoses were made by the first author after receiving training. 
3.2 PREVIOUS PROTOCOLS 
Former participants of both CT studies were adult patients with unipolar depression (relapse 
prevention study: 18-70 years old; study of CT response: 18-55 years old). The relapse 
prevention study (full methodology described in R. B. Jarrett & Thase, 2010) required one or 
more prior episodes of depression with complete inter-episode recovery or antecedent dysthymia, 
while the study of CT response also accepted individuals in their first episode. 
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In both studies, inclusion criteria were DSM-IV (SCID) diagnosis of MDD and a score 
14 or above on the 17-item HRSD at the first two interviews. Additionally, the study of acute CT 
response required a score of 15 or above on the Beck Depression Inventory II at the initial 
screening session. In both studies, participants were excluded if they had severe or poorly 
controlled concurrent medical disorders that may cause depression or if they required medication 
that could cause depressive symptoms, if they had DSM-IV (SCID) psychotic or organic mental 
disorder, bipolar I or II disorder, active alcohol or drug dependence, primary obsessive 
compulsive disorder or primary eating disorder (where primary refers to the diagnosis associated 
with the most functional impairment), active suicide risk, or had previously failed to respond to a 
trial of at least 8 weeks of CT conducted by a certified therapist. The relapse prevention study 
also excluded participants who had previously not responded to 6 or more weeks of 40 mg of 
fluoxetine. 
In both studies participants completed informed consent, underwent a supervised 
medication withdrawal period if medicated, then had 16-20 sessions of CT over 12-14 weeks, 
delivered according to the guidelines of Beck (1979). In the relapse prevention study, therapists 
were required to maintain Cognitive Therapy Scale scores (Young & A. T. Beck, 1980) >= 40. 
Experienced faculty members led weekly supervision in which groups watched and completed 
the CTS for randomly selected, videotaped sessions. Therapy supervisors and their teams used 
the CTS to provide feedback to therapists. 
In contrast, in the study of acute CT response, scores >= 40 on the Cognitive Therapy 
Scale were achieved only on 41 of 56 (73%) of rated videotapes (M = 43.9, SD = 10.0, min = 19, 
max = 61). Thus, competence in delivering CT was not as well established in the study of acute 
CT response. 
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The protocols had different continuation conditions. In the study of acute CT response, 
participants were not assigned research-protocol treatment following acute CT, although non-
responders and partial-responders were referred for non-research follow-up treatment. Relapse-
recurrence was assessed at a four-month follow-up assessment using the LIFE. In the relapse 
prevention study, responders were randomly assigned to continuation treatment based on their 
risk level. "Low-risk" responders with minimal residual symptomatology were evaluated for 
depressive relapses with the LIFE for 32 additional months (delivered every four months), while 
"high-risk" responders were randomized to one of three interventions for 8 months followed by 
24 months of LIFE assessment delivered every four months. Interventions were (1) 
Continuation-CT, a form of CT designed to help euthymic individuals to consolidate and 
generalize skills learned in CT, (2) Continuation-Placebo, in which an inert drug was delivered in 
a double-blind fashion, and (3) Continuation-Fluoxetine, in which 10-40 mg of fluoxetine was 
delivered in a double-blind fashion. 
3.3 TASK 
Session 2 consisted of two experimental blocks presented sequentially (Figure 2). For all 
participants, the "Naturalistic Block," in which participants were asked to process dysfunctional 
thoughts as they normally would, preceded the "Reappraise Block," in which participants were 
instructed to deploy CT skills by cognitively challenging each dysfunctional thought, e.g., 
thinking of ways in which the statement is not true or mentally responding to the thought with a 
more realistic statement. The block order was fixed so that instructions to reappraise would not 
bias individuals' naturalistic responses. 
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Each block began with instructions on how to cognitively respond to the negative 
statements that would be presented on a computer screen. In the Naturalistic Block, participants 
were asked to imagine the statements as their own thoughts and to deal with them as they 
normally would (refer to Instructions for laboratory task, Naturalistic Block). These instructions 
were designed to provoke the typical manner in which participants cope with negative thoughts 
in their everyday life, and hence to maximize ecological validity of results. In contrast, during 
the Reappraise Block, participants were asked explicitly to reappraise each sentence (refer to 
Instructions for laboratory task, Reappraisal Block) according to the guidelines of the ~40-
minute course of computerized CT. We included this block to test whether individual differences 
demonstrated under naturalistic conditions were upheld in a more tightly controlled condition 
with explicit instructions to deploy CT skills. 
After receiving the instruction, in the Naturalistic Block participants completed the 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) to provide a baseline measure of dysfunctional attitudes 
used to calculate cognitive reactivity. In both blocks, participants were then administered a 
negative mood induction intended to activate the kind of dysfunctional interpretations of stressful 
life events that is thought to underlie vulnerability to depression recurrence (Z. V. Segal et al., 
1999). Since a stress provocation of some sort is generally necessary to reveal latent 
dysfunctional processing and relapse-recurrence vulnerability in recovered depressed individuals 
(Z. V. Segal & Ingram, 1994), we reasoned that CT skills would be critical to assess in the 
context of a stress provocation. 
After the mood induction, mood was assessed after the induction with the Sadness 
subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Extended Form (PANAS-SAD). Pupil 
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dilation was then measured (as described below) to assess effort and emotional engagement 
during presentation of the previously selected 15 most self-relevant dysfunctional statements.  
To ensure that all pupil measurements were task-related, participants were instructed to 
advance to the next statement whenever they found themselves getting off-task or distracted (cf. 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). This was meant to decrease the likelihood that participants 
would engage in significant mind-wandering during pupil assessment. In the Naturalistic Block, 
each statement was preceded by a 2500-ms fixation mask (row of Xs) to establish a baseline 
measurement for each trial. In the Reappraise Block, each statement was preceded by 2000-ms 
reminder text ("REFRAME"), followed by 500-ms of display of a row of "X"s. For those 
participants who advanced through all 15 items before 5 minutes, statements were repeated. 
After 5 minutes, participants completed the PANAS-SAD again to assess recovery of sad mood, 
followed by a battery of self-report measures, including the Challenging Negative Thoughts 
Scale to assess challenging of task sentences and, in the Naturalistic Block only, the alternative 
form of the DAS to compute the cognitive reactivity score. 
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Figure 2. Task design 
 
A positive mood induction was administered to aid participants’ return to a euthymic 
state. 
Participants who were part of the original one-session protocol (n = 4) were compensated 
$20 for their time. Participants who were part of the two-session protocol were compensated $35 
for attending both sessions (n = 16) or $15 if they did not return for the second session (n = 2). 
Participants underwent two blocks in which a sad mood induction was provided and then pupil 
dilation was measured during 5 minutes of self-paced presentation of self-relevant dysfunctional statements. 
During the first block ("Naturalistic Block"), participants were asked to imagine the statements as their own 
thoughts and to deal with them in whatever way they normally would. During the second block 
("Reappraisal Block"), participants were asked to provide cognitive reappraisals for each thought according 
to the guidelines of a computerized CT refresher course. DAS 1 = first presentation of Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, DAS 2 = alternative form of Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale. DAS was measured only during 
the Naturalistic Block. PANAS-SAD = Sadness scale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
DAS 2 
PANAS-SAD 5-min post-induction 
Task-related Challenging 
PANAS-SAD post-induction DAS 1 
 XXXX or 
REFRAME 
I'M A LOSER. 
[INSTRUCTIONS TO REACT 
NORMALLY 
or 
REAPPRAISE] 
7 min 5 min 5 min or ~40 min 
Measure pupil during task reminder 
and self-paced negative statements 
Instructions Sad mood 
induction 
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All subjects were paid an additional $10 bonus at the second session if they arrived on-time to 
both sessions. 
3.4 PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION 
Stimuli were displayed in black on a light gray computer screen to minimize dilation to changes 
in illumination associated with stimulus onset and offset. A row of Xs was displayed before 
stimulus onset to separate trials and to minimize any subsequent light reflect. Participants sat 
approximately 28.75" from the bottom of the stimulus. Stimuli were sentence-case letters 
approximately .25 inches high, subtending .009° of visual angle. Data were collected using the 
ISCAN RK464 pupillometer. The pupillometer consisted of a video camera and infrared light 
source pointed at a participant’s left eye and a device that tracked the location and size of the 
pupil using these tools. Pupil size was recorded at 60 Hz and passed digitally from the 
pupillometer to a computer that stored the acquired data along with signals marking the 
beginning and end of trials. Data collection was managed using ISCAN’s included software. 
Testing occurred with the participant alone in a moderately lit room. We developed and 
presented the sentences task using E-Prime 2 software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002). Because the mood induction task had already been developed for the original version of 
E-Prime, we used the older software version to present mood induction tasks. Differences in 
software version are not thought to affect study results. 
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3.5 PREPROCESSING 
Data were cleaned using our lab’s standard methodology (Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008), 
including blink and artifact rejection. Eye blinks were identified and replaced by linear  
interpolations from 4 samples before to 4 samples after the identified blink. Trials were removed 
from consideration if they consisted of over 50% blinks or had pupil dilation values greater than 
4 standard deviations from the within-subject mean. Data cleaning procedures resulted in the 
elimination of median Md = 7.0, mean ± standard deviation, range, M= 12.4 ± 12.9, 1 - 42, trials 
per subject out of Md = 61.5, M = 69.2 ± 32.1, 29-124, trials presented. Expressed as a 
proportion, cleaning resulted in discarding Md = 8.9%, M =14.7% ± 10.6%, 3.4% - 36.5%, of 
total trials. These statistics exclude participants with missing data from the Reappraisal Block (n 
= 2). Data were smoothed by applying a 3-point unweighted average filter twice. Pupil diameter, 
measured at time of participant's button press, was subtracted from subsequent trial-related pupil 
diameter to produce pupil motility indices. 
Within each subject, mean pupil dilation for each block (Naturalistic Block or 
Reappraisal Block) was computed by averaging only the trials that lasted to a given sample or 
longer. Thus, a condition-related mean for the first sample would be calculated from 100% of the 
trials – since all trials were at least one sample long – whereas the condition-related mean of a 
later sample would be calculated from only those trials that lasted at least to that point. To 
provide adequate signal-to-noise ratio, we chose to end a condition-related mean when it would 
be comprised of fewer than four trials. 
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3.6 COGNITIVE REACTIVITY 
Cognitive reactivity was employed as an analog for both effectiveness of coping and relapse-
recurrence risk status. This construct is conceptualized as the ease to which a dysfunctional 
thinking style can be made accessible when provoked in some way (Z. V. Segal et al., 2006). It is 
calculated by subtracting an initial score on the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman 
& A. T. Beck, 1978) to a score of the alternative-form DAS delivered following a stress 
provocation such as a sad mood induction. Segal et al. (1999, 2006) have demonstrated that 
change in dysfunctional attitude endorsement is positively associated with subsequent relapse-
recurrence. Thus, this measure may be used as a potential marker of relapse-recurrence risk. In 
the current context, cognitive reactivity may also tap effectiveness of challenging, since it was 
measured following cognitive responses to negative thoughts. 
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
To assess frequency of CT skill use years after CT completion, descriptive statistics of current 
SoCT-P scores were examined and summarized. To compare CT skill use years after treatment 
to previous CT skill use (Figure 3; path a), we tested the effect of time on SoCT-P score with a 
mixed effects analysis with Time (mid-acute, post-acute, 3-month follow-up, current) as an 
ordinal repeated fixed effect with AR1 autocorrelation structure, subject as a random effect, and 
SoCT-P as the dependent variable. 
To assess the relationship between CT skill use and effort and emotional engagement in 
response to negative sentences (path b), we tested the correlation between SoCT-P and mean 
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Naturalistic Block pupil dilation at every sample. We used Guthrie and Buchwald’s (1991) 
technique for controlling Type 1 Error, as it has been adapted for pupil dilation data (Siegle, 
Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004; Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, et al., 2003; Siegle, Steinhauer, Stenger, 
et al., 2003). In particular, for each sample, we calculated the correlation between mean pupil 
dilation and SoCT-P. A correlation at any particular sample was judged to be statistically 
significant if and only if data from several consecutive samples were also significantly correlated 
with SoCT-P. We used simulations to determine the number of significant consecutive tests 
required to judge a region as statistically significant. We simulated 1000 sets of 18 randomly 
generated waveforms (corresponding to the current sample size of n = 18). To better represent 
current data, waveforms were constrained to have an autocorrelation equivalent to that found in 
the current data. Autocorrelation of the current data was defined using Guthrie and Buchwald's 
(1991) method, with principal components set a priori at 3, yielding rxx = 0.96. After generating 
the random waveforms, we calculated a temporal contiguity threshold such that, in less than 5% 
of simulations, there would be a time period longer than the threshold during which waveforms 
were significantly correlated with arbitrary values (i.e., random numbers). Simulation results 
indicated that 483 ms  of contiguous tests significant at p < 0.10 would be needed to judge a 
given window significant at p < 0.05. In an exploratory fashion, we examined what results would 
be obtained when setting principal components to be 4 or 5, resulting in rxx = 0.95 or 0.94 and 
temporal thresholds of 417 ms or 350 ms. 
To assess the extent to which these results were likely consistent with reappraisal 
processes, time intervals with significant correlations during the Naturalistic Block were 
examined in the Reappraise Block for a significant correlation in the same direction. 
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Finally, to assess the effectiveness of coping among CT skill users (path d), we assessed 
the correlations between SoCT-P scores with two indices of coping success: PANAS-SAD score 
after sentence viewing ("Residual Sadness") and cognitive reactivity. To examine robustness of 
effects, PANAS-SAD score from immediately following the mood induction was stepped into 
the model first to test whether pupil dilation (path c) and SoCT-P explained significantly more 
variance in residual sadness. Then interaction terms were entered as a third step. To assess 
generalizability, significant findings from paths b and c were re-examined in Reappraisal Block. 
In all analyses, variables were Winsorized to minimize the influence of potential outliers. 
In particular, values greater than the 75th percentile + 1.5 * the interquartile range, were reduced 
to the nearest valid value, and values lesser than the 25th percentile – 1.5 * the interquartile 
range, were increased to the nearest valid value. 
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Path a represents the trajectory of CT skill use over time, leading to its current value 2-6 years 
following CT. Path b represents level of effort and emotional engagement involved in how CT skill users 
respond to negative thoughts. Path c represents the extent to which level of effort and emotional engagement 
is linked to adaptive emotional outcomes, such as lack of increase in dysfunctional attitudes following a mood 
induction ("cognitive reactivity"), and residual sadness five minutes after a mood induction. Path d 
represents whether CT skill users are more likely to experience these adaptive emotional outcomes compared 
to CT skill non-users. 
Figure 3. Relationships examined in the present study 
b 
Pupil Dilation 
Cognitive Reactivity 
———— 
PANAS-SAD 0 or 5 min post-mood induction 
c 
d 
Past SoCT-P SoCT-P 
a 
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4.0  RESULTS 
4.1 TO WHAT EXTENT ARE CT SKILLS STILL USED YEARS AFTER 
TREATMENT? (FIGURE 3, PATH A) 
SoCT-P responses indicated that, on average, participants reported using CT skills between 
“half” and “most” of the time in the past month (Table 2). Mixed effects analysis revealed a 
significant effect of Time (mid-acute, post-acute, 3-month follow-up, current) on SoCT-P 
(Figure 4), p = 0.008, η2 = 0.19. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that current SoCT-P was not 
significantly different from mid-therapy scores, p = 0.69, D = -0.10, significantly lower than 
post-acute SoCT-P, p = 0.04, D =.49, and not significantly different from 4-month follow-up 
scores, p = 0.82, D = 0.05. 
This pattern of results suggested that CT skills may have increased from mid- to post-
acute before returning to mid-acute levels and remaining at that value. To test this interpretation, 
we conducted post-hoc tests comparing SoCT-P at each time period with SoCT-P at the 
subsequent time period. Mid-acute SoCT-P was significantly lower than post-acute SoCT-P, p = 
0.0001, D =.58, which was, in turn, significantly higher than 4-month follow-up SoCT-P, p = 
0.003, D = 0.43. 
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Table 2. Change in self-reported use of CT skills over time 
 
Mid-acute Post-acute 
4 month follow-
up 
2-6 year follow-
up 
n 16 16 15 22 
M 3.26a 3.80b 3.41a 3.35a 
SD 0.58 0.63 0.73 0.79 
Minimum 2.25 2.50 1.88 1.88 
Maximum 4.25 4.75 4.38 4.88 
 
"Mid-acute" refers to the first time the measure was administered, during the midpoint of 16-20 
week Cognitive Therapy. "Post-acute" refers to the end of the acute therapy regimen. "4 month follow-up" is 
self-explanatory. "2-6 year follow-up" refers to scores from the present study. 
Means with different subscripts are significantly different, p < 0.05. 
SoCT-P: Skills of Cognitive Therapy questionnaire. 
 
 
In the current sample, self-reported use of CT skills, as indexed by the SoCT-P increased from mid-
acute CT to post-acute CT before returning to mid-acute level for the 4-month follow-up and for the current 
2-6 year follow-up. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Starred comparisons are significant at p < 
0.05. 
Figure 4. Change in self-reported use of CT skills over time 
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4.2 TASK MANIPULATION CHECKS 
Analyses of usefulness and effort of CT skill depend on the success of laboratory manipulations. 
Thus, we first sought to verify the effectiveness of our manipulations. 
4.2.1 Were participants sad after the mood inductions? 
After the first mood induction, eighteen out of nineteen participants reported sadness on the 
PANAS-SAD. The one participant who reported no sadness was excluded from further analyses 
on this block. In the remaining sample, mean response on PANAS-SAD items fell between 2 
(i.e., "a little" sad, blue, downhearted, alone, and lonely) and 3 ("moderately" sad, etc.), 
suggestive of mild sadness (total PANAS-SAD M = 11.00, SD = 3.73). 
After the second negative mood induction, sixteen participants reported sadness on the 
PANAS-SAD. The three participants who reported no sadness were excluded from further 
analyses of this block. In the remaining sample, mean response on PANAS-SAD items was 2 ("a 
little" sad, etc.), again suggestive of mild sadness (total PANAS-SAD M = 10.19, SD = 3.13). 
A paired t-test comparing PANAS-SAD following the first mood induction versus 
PANAS-SAD following the second mood induction did not reveal a statistically significant 
difference, t(15) = 0.89, p = 0.39, D = 0.44, d = 0.22. 
We concluded that there was no apparent difference between sadness elicited in the first 
induction versus the second induction, and that participants were mildly sad following both 
inductions. This level of sadness was of the same magnitude of that found in other mood 
induction studies of recovered depressed individuals. After normalizing sadness ratings to 0-
100%, sadness in the current study corresponded to 28%, whereas other studies have measured 
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mean ratings of 6% (Gemar, Z. V. Segal, Sagrati, & S. J. Kennedy, 2001), 30% (Z. V. Segal et 
al., 2006), and 17% (Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997). The mood inductions appeared to be successful. 
4.2.2 Was trait CT skill use related to CT skill use during the experimental task? 
To guide interpretation of task-related results, we tested whether those who scored higher on the 
SoCT-P also reported greater challenging of negative thoughts during the laboratory assessment. 
In the Naturalistic Block, there was a non-significant association of moderate effect size 
between SoCT-P and Task-related Challenging, F(1,17) = 4.27, r = 0.46, p = 0.055.  
In contrast, for the Reappraisal Block, Task-related Challenging was minimally and not 
significantly correlated with SoCT-P scores, F(1,14) = 0.12, r = 0.09, p = 0.74. Since the 
Reappraisal Block was preceded by a refresher CT training course, the training may have caused 
individuals to calibrate their frequency of challenging negative thoughts to the same level. On 
this interpretation, one would predict a negative association between SoCT-P and increase in 
Task-related Challenging from the Naturalistic Block to the Reappraisal Block, such that low-
SoCT-P individuals would increase challenging more than high-SoCT-P individuals. More 
power is needed to support or disconfirm this claim: the correlation between SoCT-P and change 
in Challenging was of moderate magnitude but not statistically significant, F(1,14) = 2.36, r = -
0.39, p = 0.15. 
In summary, during the Naturalistic Block there was a moderate relationship between 
trait and state CT skill use, while during the Reappraisal Block this relationship was not detected. 
Results from the Naturalistic Block may be more interpretable than those from the Reappraisal 
Block. 
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4.3 DO CT SKILL USERS EXPEND SIGNIFICANT EFFORT AND EMOTIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT WHILE VIEWING NEGATIVE THOUGHTS? (FIGURE 3, PATH B) 
In the Naturalistic Block, significant negative correlations (ps < 0.1) emerged between SoCT-P 
and pupil dilation at several time regions. The first region was 1230 – 1540 ms following trial 
onset, F(1,17) = 4.01, r = -0.45,  p = 0.06. However, the length of significant contiguous 
correlations (310 ms) did not surpass the temporal contiguity threshold needed to control Type 1 
error at p < 0.05 (483 ms, or in an exploratory fashion, 450 ms or 317 ms). Therefore, this effect 
was not investigated further. 
Significant negative correlations between SoCT-P and pupil dilation (ps < 0.1) were also 
present 1790 – 2830 ms following trial onset (Figure 5), F(1,17) = 11.40, r = -0.64, p = 0.004. 
This region spanned 710 ms prior to sentence onset through 330 ms following sentence onset. In 
the Reappraisal Block, there was not a statistically significant relationship between SoCT-P and 
pupil dilation during this time interval, F(1,15) = 1.19, r = -0.28, p = 0.29. Throughout the entire 
Reappraisal Block, pupil dilation was not significantly correlated with SoCT-P. 
We conducted follow-up tests to determine whether lack of statistical significance in 
Reappraisal Block might be attributed to task differences as opposed to a lower signal-to-noise 
ratio. First, we examined whether pupillary responses to the Reappraisal Block during the 
previously identified region, 1790 – 2830 ms, were significantly different from those during 
Naturalistic Block. If so, this could indicate the presence of different cognitive and emotional 
processes involved in the two tasks rather than greater noise. A paired t-test revealed that 
Reappraisal pupil dilation was significantly lower than Naturalistic pupil dilation during this time 
period, t(15) = -3.05, p = 0.01, D = -0.02, d = -0.76.  This result could indicate that relationships 
between SoCT-P and pupil were not evident in the Reappraisal Block because in that block low-
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SoCT-P individuals reduced their pupillary responses, equaling the pupillary responses of high-
SoCT-P individuals. However, again, more power is needed to test this hypothesis: SoCT-P 
score was moderately but nonsignificantly correlated with degree of pupil change from the 
Naturalistic Block to the Reappraisal Block, F(1,15) = 2.74, r = 0.40, p = 0.12. 
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For illustrative purposes, the top panel shows participants as part of two groups separated by a 
median split based on SoCT-P. It is evident in the top panel that high CT skill users have significantly lower 
pupil responses than low CT skill users, from 710 ms pre-sentence to 330 ms post-sentence. In the bottom 
figure, pupil values are averaged across the region of contiguous significance tests and plotted against SoCT-
P, resulting in a significant negative correlation between SoCT-P and pupil dilation during this time interval, 
p < 0.004. 
Figure 5. Relationship of pupil motility to self-reported use of CT skills  
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4.4 DO CT SKILL USERS DEMONSTRATE MORE ADAPTIVE EMOTIONAL 
OUTCOMES? (FIGURE 3, PATH D) 
In the Naturalistic Block, SoCT-P was non-significantly negatively associated with sadness 
remaining after the sentences task with a moderate effect size, F(1,17) = 4.07, r = -0.45, p = 
0.06. 
However, SoCT-P was significantly negatively associated with sadness immediately 
following the mood induction, F(1,17) = 4.53, p = 0.049, r = -0.47, which in turn was 
significantly correlated with sadness remaining after the sentences task, F(1,17) = 11.29, r = 
0.64, p = 0.004. We tested whether SoCT-P was correlated with sadness-remaining above and 
beyond that contributed by the first sadness rating. The addition of SoCT-P to the model did not 
significantly increase the F value, ΔF(1,15) = 0.76, p = 0.40, ΔR2 = 0.03. Thus, the association 
between SoCT-P and sadness after the task could have been due to an effect of SoCT-P on the 
effectiveness of the mood induction itself or to a relationship of SoCT-P with baseline level of 
sadness. 
SoCT-P scores were non-significantly correlated with cognitive reactivity with a 
moderate effect size, F(1,17) = 4.06, r = -0.45, p = 0.06 (Figure 6). In this case, SoCT-P does not 
appear to be a proxy for mood, as mood itself was minimally and not significantly associated 
with cognitive reactivity, F(1,17) = 0.13, r = 0.09, p = 0.73. After including sadness immediately 
following the mood induction as a first step, the addition of SoCT-P into the model significantly 
increases the variance explained in cognitive reactivity, ∆F(1,15) = 5.71, p = 0.03, ∆R2 = 0.28. 
Adding an interaction term of mood and SoCT-P did not explain significantly more variance, 
∆F(1,14) = 0.19, p = 0.67, ∆R2 = 0.01. Furthermore, SoCT-P was unrelated to baseline level of 
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dysfunctional attitudes, F(1,17) = 0.65, r = -0.20, p = 0.43. Thus, SoCT-P appears to be a 
reasonable albeit not statistically significant predictor of cognitive reactivity. 
 
 
Although not statistically significant, a moderate effect size supported the notion that individuals 
who used CT skills more frequently had lower cognitive reactivity, i.e., they were less likely to increase 
endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes following a sad mood induction. 
Figure 6. Relationship between self-reported use of CT skills and cognitive reactivity 
4.5 IS EFFORT AND EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT RELEVANT TO COPING 
OUTCOMES? (FIGURE 3, PATH C) 
In the Naturalistic Block, significant correlations emerged between sadness remaining after the 
sentences task and pupil dilation at 1180 – 1710 ms following trial onset, F(1,17) = 4.80, r = 
0.48, p = 0.04. To test whether pupil dilation here was more than a proxy for mood, we entered 
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pre-task sadness in the first step of a linear regression and then entered in a term representing 
mean pupil dilation during this time interval. The addition of pupil dilation to the model 
nonsignificantly explained more variance with a moderate effect size, ∆F(1,15) = 2.74, p = 0.12, 
∆R2 = 0.13. The further addition of a pupil x initial mood interaction term to the model did not 
explain more variance, ∆F(1,15) = 0.08, p = 0.79, ∆R2 = 0.00. Since results suggest that pupil 
dilation may be a proxy for mood here, we tested correlations between pre-task sadness and pupil 
dilation. Results suggested significant positive correlations of large magnitude, 2180 ms to 3940 
ms, interval = 1760 ms, F(1,17) = 9.08, p = 0.008, r = 0.60. It is concluded that the relationship 
of pupil dilation to sadness after the sentences task may be at least partially explained by the 
relationship of pupil dilation to sadness before the sentences task. 
The second coping outcome measure, cognitive reactivity, was significantly correlated 
with pupil dilation 1260-1740 ms following trial onset, F(1,17) = 4.57, p = 0.048, r = 0.47, and 
at 1950-2220 ms,  F(1,17) = 4.68, p = 0.046, r = 0.48. The first temporal region was long enough 
only to pass the exploratory contiguity threshold, while the second temporal region was not long 
enough to survive thresholding. Results from these two time regions did not generalize to the 
Reappraisal Block, F(1,17) = 0.94, p = 0.35, r = 0.23, and F(1,17) = 0.004, p = 0.95, r = 0.02, 
respectively. 
Post-sentences sadness was moderately but non-significantly correlated with pupil 
dilation during the period in which SoCT-P and pupil dilation are correlated, F(1,17) = 3.77, r = 
0.44, p = 0.07, as was cognitive reactivity, F(1,17) = 2.95, r = 0.39, p = 0.11. 
We tested for outliers in all analyses resulting in borderline significance. Outliers 
emerged in the correlation between pupil dilation and cognitive reactivity: two individuals met 
criteria for both high influence (Cook’s D > 4/(n – k – 1); Fox, 1991) and high leverage (leverage 
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> 2p/n; Hoaglin & Welsch, 1978), suggesting that they may be considered outliers. After 
excluding these two individuals, there was a significant positive correlation between pupil 
dilation and cognitive reactivity, F(1,16) = 10.66, r = .51, p = 0.04. 
4.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Using only the two SoCT-P items that assess challenging of negative thoughts, a significant 
correlation of moderate effect size still remained between the SoCT-P and Naturalistic Block 
pupil dilation from 1790 – 2830 ms following trial onset, F(1,17) = 10.123, r = -0.62, p = 0.006. 
We also tested whether pupil dilation during this time period was also related to Task-
related Challenging. We observed a significant negative correlation of moderate effect size 
between pupil dilation and Task-related Challenging, F(1,17) = 5.075, r = -0.49, p = 0.04. 
Excluding individuals taking psychiatric medication did not change eliminate the 
correlation between SoCT-P and Naturalistic Block pupil, 1790 – 2830 ms following trial onset, 
F(1,14) = 5.89, p = 0.03, r = -0.56. Excluding those who had received Continuation Cognitive 
Therapy did not change this result either, F(1,12) = 8.58, p = 0.01, r = -0.66. 
We confirmed that pupil results were not an index of current depressive symptomatology 
as measured by the QIDS. Nowhere during the Naturalistic Block pupil dilation time-series was 
pupil dilation significantly correlated with QIDS, all ps > 0.2, all R2s < 0.10. 
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4.7 EXPLORATORY ANALYSES 
Since, on average, current SoCT-P was not significantly greater than scores at any other time 
period, we sought to test whether current SoCT-P represents any skill use or, alternatively, 
whether current SoCT-P represents the lowest score that participants generally provide. Since no 
baseline measure of pre-treatment SoCT was collected, we chose a comparison point of 
individuals with the lowest mean: individuals who do not respond to acute CT. At mid-therapy, 
those who go on to not respond to CT demonstrate lower SoCT-P than those who do eventually 
respond to CT (R. B. Jarrett et al., 2011). Thus, to confirm that CT skill use in the present sample 
did not represent the lowest scores measurable, we compared SoCT-P in the current sample and 
with mid-acute SoCT-P in non-responders within the Pittsburgh arm of the relapse prevention 
study. Current SoCT-P was nonsignificantly greater than mid-acute SoCT-P in non-responders, 
with a small-to-medium effect size, t(52) = 1.46, p = 0.15, D = 0.29, d = 0.40. At mid-acute, non-
responders (n = 32) on average endorsed using CT skills "half the time" over the last month (M = 
3.06, SD = 0.66, min = 1.58, max = 4.38), while the current sample (n = 22) on average endorsed 
using CT skills between “half” and “most” of the time in the past month (M = 3.35, SD = 0.79, 
min = 1.88, max = 4.88). 
Exploratory analyses indicated no significant relationship between SoCT-P and mean 
sentence viewing time during Naturalistic Block, F(1,17) = 0.39, r = -0.15, p = 0.54, or 
Reappraisal Block, F(1,15) = 0.01, r = 0.03, p = 0.91. 
SoCT-P scores were not significantly related to post-acute relapse as measured by the 
LIFE, t(20) = 0.84, p = 0.41, D = 0.29, d = 0.36. Pupil dilation during the SoCT-P-relevant time 
interval was also not related to post-acute relapse, t(16) = -1.41, p = 0.18, D = 0.02, d = 0.67. 
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Pupil dilation from 2550 to 3420 ms, was significantly associated with post-acute relapse, 
t(16) = 2.13, p = 0.049, D = 0.03, d = 1.01, such that individuals with lower pupil dilation during 
that time period were less likely to have had a relapse following acute CT. 
We conducted additional exploratory analyses to investigate whether anticipatory anxiety 
might be related to the unexpected timing of the current results, i.e., SoCT-P was related to 
pupillary dilation before each sentence was displayed. Although we did not have measures of 
anxiety, we tested whether history of anxiety disorder accounted for these results. History of 
anxiety disorder was not significantly associated with pupil dilation during the SoCT-P-relevant 
time interval, t(16) = 0.73, p  =.48, D = 0.01, d = 0.35, although there was a significant 
association between past anxiety and pupil dilation during an earlier time period (100-350 ms) 
that did not pass temporal contiguity threshold, t(16) = 2.36, p = 0.03, D = 0.01, d = 1.14. 
We further sought to examine whether the pre-stimulus timing of the current results could 
reflect carryover processing from the previous trial. For each trial, we first expressed pupillary 
dilation in terms of previous trial activity, by subtracting pupil dilation from the sentence onset 
of the previous trial from the pupil dilation during each sample of the current trial. After 
recomputing mean pupil dilation at each sample, mean pupil dilation remained significantly 
correlated with SoCT-P during the same time period as found in the primary analysis, 710 ms 
prior to sentence onset through 330 ms following sentence onset, F(1,17) = 6.78, p = 0.02, r = -
0.55. 
We investigated late pupil dilation, defined as 4000-6000 ms after trial onset (based on 
visual inspection of mean pupil dilation curves). Current SoCT-P was nonsignificantly 
negatively associated with pupil dilation during this period, F(1,15) = 0.621, p = 0.44, r = -0.21. 
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To better understand the unexpected association between SoCT-P and PANAS-SAD 
immediately post-mood induction, we investigated other variables that may be associated with 
PANAS-SAD immediately post-mood induction. Scores on this measure were not significantly 
related to QIDS scores, F(1,19) = 0.80, r = -0.21, p = 0.38, to cognitive reactivity, F(1,17) = 
0.64, r = 0.20, p = 0.44, to last known 17-item Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression from their 
previous relapse prevention study, F(1,17) = 0.46, r = -0.17, p = 0.51, or to last known BDI from 
the previous study, F(1,17) = 1.0, r = -0.24, p = 0.33. PANAS-SAD did not appear to be related 
to the quantity of current SCID MDE symptoms, as only one participant in the current sample 
met criteria for any MDE symptoms. 
Finally, we analyzed to what extent marginally nonsignificant results could be related to 
low statistical power. As shown in Table 3, at least 16 more participants would be necessary to 
be adequately powered to detect these effects. 
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Table 3. Post-hoc power analyses for correlations of marginal significance 
Analysis 
type 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Effect size p 
Current 
power 
Current 
n 
n needed 
for 0.80 
power 
Manipulation 
check 
SoCT-P 
Naturalistic 
Challenging 
r = 0.46 0.06 0.51 18 34 
Primary SoCT-P 
PANAS-SAD 5 
min post-induction 
r = -0.45 0.06 0.49 18 36 
Primary SoCT-P Cognitive reactivity r = -0.45 0.06 0.49 18 36 
Primary 
Naturalistic pupil 
dilation during 
SoCT-P-relevant 
time 
PANAS-SAD 5 
min post-induction 
r = 0.44 0.07 0.47 18 38 
Primary 
Naturalistic pupil 
dilation during 
SoCT-P-relevant 
time 
Cognitive reactivity r = 0.39 0.11 0.37 18 49 
Sensitivity 
Naturalistic pupil 
dilation 
PANAS-SAD 5 
min post-induction 
after accounting for 
PANAS-SAD 0 
min post-induction 
∆R2 = 0.13 0.12 0.30 16 55 
Exploratory SoCT-P 
ΔChallenging from 
Naturalistic to 
Reappraisal 
r = -0.39 0.15 0.31 15 49 
Exploratory SoCT-P 
ΔPupil dilation 
from Naturalistic to 
Reappraisal 
r = 0.40 0.12 0.35 16 46 
Exploratory SoCT-P 
Mid-acute SoCT-P 
of non-responders 
d = .40 0.15 0.29 54 328 
Exploratory SoCT-P 
Late pupil dilation 
(4-6 sec after trial 
onset) 
r = -.21 0.44 0.12 16 289 
        
SoCT-P: Skills of Cognitive Therapy – Patient questionnaire. 
PANAS-SAD: Sadness subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Extended 
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5.0  DISCUSSION 
Here we investigated the use, usefulness, and effort involved in deploying a core CT skill, 
cognitive reappraisal of negative thoughts, years after CT is completed. To assess frequency of 
CT skill use, we asked individuals who had responded to research-protocol CT 2-6 years ago to 
complete the SoCT-P self-report measure. Results suggested that participants generally continue 
to make use of CT skills around half the time. Although this frequency was somewhat reduced 
compared to frequency immediately post-therapy, it was noteworthy that skill use did not decline 
from its level at 4 months post-therapy. This is consistent with the notion that CT teaches 
individuals tools that they can continue to use independently, without the guidance of an expert 
(Glasman et al., 2004). Similar effects, in which some level of therapy skill use is maintained at 
follow-up, have been found in investigations of CT for depression in older adults (Powers et al., 
2008), Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction (Baer, 2003), and Mindfulness-based Cognitive 
Therapy for depressive relapse prevention (Bondolfi et al., 2010). What is particularly important 
in this study is the length of the follow-up. It is remarkable that participants continue to use CT-
related skill up to six years later, suggesting that participants continue to find CT skills relevant 
long after therapy completion. 
Still, caution must be warranted, as there was no baseline pre-therapy measure of CT skill 
use. It cannot be ruled out that participants are simply using CT-consistent skills to the same 
extent as they were pre-therapy. Anecdotally, most but not all participants attributed their use of 
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reappraisal to CT, but empirically validating these reports (e.g., by including a CT skills use 
assessment at pre-treatment) will be important for future research. 
We examined the potential usefulness of CT skills by testing the correlation between 
SoCT-P and two adaptive emotional outcomes: greater recovery from a sad mood and lower 
cognitive reactivity. With respect to the former, we observed a nonsignificant negative 
association of moderate magnitude between use of CT skills and prolonged sadness following a 
sad mood induction. However, interpretation of this result is ambiguous because SoCT-P was 
also associated with sad mood directly following a mood induction. In other words, individuals 
who use CT skills more frequently tended to have less post-mood induction sadness, which in 
turn predicts more prolonged sadness. 
The evidence is consistent with several non-exclusive potential interpretations. CT skill 
users may have a lower baseline level of sadness, less reactivity to sad mood inductions, and/or 
greater recovery from sad mood inductions. Future studies may take several steps to disentangle 
these possible interpretations. First, by assessing pre-mood induction levels of sadness, the 
relative contributions of baseline mood and mood reactivity may be better understood. Second, 
with a larger sample size it may be useful to remove from analysis CT skill users who do not 
achieve a high level of sadness following a mood induction. In this way, level of sadness post 
mood-induction could be held constant and the relationship between CT skill use and mood 
recovery could be more clearly understood. 
In contrast, results related to cognitive reactivity were not easily attributable to mood 
differences. CT skills use moderately though non-significantly predicted less cognitive reactivity, 
and it did not predict potential confounding variables (baseline level of dysfunctional attitudes or 
post-mood induction sadness). This suggests that individuals who continue to make use of CT 
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skills are not as vulnerable to activation of mood-congruent dysfunctional thinking. Lower 
cognitive reactivity has itself predicted lower rates of relapse (Z. V. Segal et al., 1999, 2006), 
suggesting that CT skill use may similarly predict lower relapse rates. This is consistent with 
hypotheses that continued CT skill use underlies CT's enduring relapse-prevention effects 
(Hollon, 2003; Hollon et al., 2006; R. B. Jarrett & Kraft, 1997). 
On this basis it is possible that CT skill users experience no increase in dysfunctional 
thoughts when primed with a negative mood, or it is also possible that CT skill users may 
automatically or voluntarily challenge dysfunctional thinking patterns that are activated by a 
mood induction. Another possibility is that CT skill use is a proxy for another variable, such as 
general life stress, that could be related to cognitive reactivity. 
Taken together, results of the "effectiveness" analyses suggest that CT skill use is 
associated with adaptive emotional outcomes. This suggests that skill use may be useful to 
deploy even in a euthymic state, and therapists may wish to devise methods to keep patients 
motivated to deploy CT skills even when no longer feeling depressed. 
At the same time, with a ~50% relapse rate even in CT responders (Vittengl, L. A. Clark, 
Dunn, & R. B. Jarrett, 2007), it is important to ask whether post-CT coping techniques can be 
improved. One potential area for improvement is that some CT skills, such as challenging 
dysfunctional negative thoughts, depend on the occurrence of those thoughts in the first place. If 
recovered depressed individuals experience only normative levels of dysfunctional thoughts (Z. 
V. Segal et al., 1999), and if CT skill practice is necessary for successful use (R. B. Jarrett et al., 
2011), then post-CT individuals may not have sufficient opportunities to practice reappraising 
negative thoughts. If this is the case, different techniques that work without negative thoughts 
could be promoted for relapse prevention this time period, such as Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
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Therapy (Teasdale et al., 2000). This form of therapy uses everyday experience as a target for 
intervention, circumventing the relative lack of dysfunctional thoughts in recovered depressed 
individuals. 
Finally, we indexed the effort and emotional engagement involved in CT skill users' 
responses to negative thoughts, by measuring pupil dilation during presentation of dysfunctional 
self-relevant thoughts. Pupil results were robust, indicating that those who use more CT skills 
tended to allocate less effort and emotional engagement in response to negative thoughts. 
Moreover, less allocation of effort and emotional engagement was itself related to adaptive 
emotional outcomes, suggesting that low pupil dilation is relevant for these outcomes. This result 
argues against the view that former CT patients voluntarily deploy effortful compensatory 
strategies to counteract automatic negative information processing biases (Barber & R. J. 
DeRubeis, 1989; R. J. DeRubeis et al., 2008; Hollon et al., 2006). In fact, those CT patients who 
continue to use CT skills generally appear to expend less effort and emotional engagement when 
coping with negative stimuli. Such former patients do not face a life of deploying arduous CT 
skills, but rather are (a) less emotionally affected by negative stimuli, and/or (b) deploy less 
effort to cope with negative thoughts, at least relative to former CT patients who do not use CT 
skills as frequently.  
Given that reduced effort and emotional involvement is associated with adaptive 
emotional outcomes, therapists may find it useful to delay treatment termination until use of CT 
skills become automatized. Additionally, effortful emotion regulatory activities such as 
completing dysfunctional thought records may be thought of as scaffolding that allows the 
patient to reach the point where disputation of negative thoughts requires little to no effort. 
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One surprising finding was that CT skill use was negatively correlated with pupil dilation 
before a negative sentence even appeared, during the time in which participants were aware that 
it would appear shortly within the next second. Here we speculate on what might account for the 
early timing of this effect. One possibility is that pupil differences result from anticipatory 
reappraisal. This would be consistent with SoCT-P and Task-related Challenging responses 
suggesting high use of reappraisal at both a trait and state level was associated with the decreased 
anticipatory pupil response. One participant, a former attorney, compared this lack of 
anticipatory anxiety to the feeling of calm that occurs when one knows that the opposing 
attorney is about to make an unconvincing case that barely warrants rebuttal. In some sense, this 
could be construed as anticipatory automatic emotion regulation, a construct that appears to be 
unexplored in the extant literature. 
However, since pupillary response is sensitive to both emotion regulation and emotion 
reactivity. a more parsimonious explanation may be that lower pupil dilation in high-SoCT-P 
individuals reflects their lower level of sadness during the task. Since pupil measurements have 
been associated with emotional intensity (e.g., Steinhauer et al., 1983), it is possible that the 
pupil differences simply index these mood differences. 
Another possibility is that the early pupil reaction in skill non-users represents anxious 
vigilance toward threat. Although the current participants did not demonstrate clinical anxiety 
disorders on the SCID and we did not assess non-clinical anxiety, the high comorbidity between 
anxiety and depression (Kaufman & Charney, 2000) and high incidence of past anxiety disorders 
in the current sample (45%) suggest that anxiety may be present. Koster et al. (2005) found that 
high trait anxiety even in the absence of a clinical disorder predicted heightened early attention 
to threatening stimuli, suggesting that vigilance or anticipation of threatening stimuli may be 
 53 
prominent in such individuals. Bradley et al. (1997) found that dysphoric individuals 
demonstrated early attention to depression-related words, and this tendency was associated with 
individual differences in anxiety, suggesting that vigilance or anticipation of self-relevant 
negative stimuli is present in depression-vulnerable individuals, but that this relates to level of 
anxiety rather than depression. It is possible, then, that recovered depressed individuals who 
make less use of CT skills are more vulnerable to anxiety-like reactions, despite the fact that the 
primary focus of the CT skills they learned was depression. 
However, it is also possible that early pupil dilation in CT skill non-users represents 
extended processing of the previous negative statement. This interpretation was bolstered by an 
exploratory analysis finding that the correlation between CT skill use and pupil dilation remains 
significant even when baseline-correcting pupil dilation to a baseline from the previous trial. 
This interpretation would be in line with a large body of research associating depression 
vulnerability to sustained processing of self-relevant negative information as opposed to early 
attention towards stimuli (for review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
Results suggest several important future lines of research, in addition to those previously 
mentioned. First, future CT studies may benefit from including the current laboratory task in 
several assessments during treatment. Such a study could fully test the theory that CT invokes a 
transient increase in controlled processing that then becomes automatic. In addition, it will be 
useful to assess whether purported CT skills are in fact specific to CT. It is possible that recovery 
from depression by any means would involve an increase in CT-consistent emotion regulatory 
strategies such as reappraising negative thoughts. This can be tested by adding the current task to 
studies comparing recovery with CT and in wait-list controls, or comparing CT to antidepressant 
medication. Finally, perhaps the most important future direction is to prospectively test whether 
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use, usefulness, and/or effort involved in CT skills can predict future relapse. If so, then 
promoting these elements may be important, and if not, it may be the case that those skills that 
aid recovery depression are different from those skills that may aid maintenance of recovery.  
Several limitations temper the conclusions of this study. The study was limited by low 
statistical power. Many effects were near statistical significance, such that the addition of further 
participants may change conclusions toward significance or non-significance. Given the 
observed moderate effect sizes, however, we find it likely that many of these effects are truly 
non-null. 
Another limitation was that SoCT-P related differences in pupil dilation during the 
Naturalistic Block were not replicated in the Reappraisal Block. Consequently, it is unclear 
whether such differences can be ascribed to differential reappraisal. The largely uninstructed 
nature of the Naturalistic Block, with few ways to probe into the cognitive processes of 
participants, imposes difficulty on any such interpretation. 
Moreover, although the current evidence suggests that CT skill users have more adaptive 
emotional outcomes and lower effort and emotional engagement in response to negative 
thoughts, it cannot be concluded that these differences are in virtue of the skill use. CT skill use 
may be associated with any number of potentially confounding individual difference variables, 
e.g., life stress, socioeconomic status, intelligence, etc. 
Finally, only 22% of the potential subject pool went on to complete the study, limiting 
the generalizability of effects. The current sample may represent only the most highly 
functioning CT responders, and relationships of variables examined here may be different in a 
more complete sample. 
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Strengths of the study include its use of laboratory measures of CT skill use and 
effectiveness, as well as the development of a laboratory induction of self-relevant negative 
thoughts. In addition, the study implemented both trait and task-related measures of CT skills so 
as to increase confidence that the validated trait measure was relevant to the experimental 
situation. Also, rather than following up patients of community therapists, the study made use of 
a subject pool that had mostly received high-fidelity research-protocol CT. 
Perhaps most importantly, the use of pupil dilation in the current study allowed us to 
discriminate among competing hypotheses concerning the level of effort and emotional 
engagement involved in CT skill users. It appears that, although acquiring CT skills may not be 
easy, implementing them after years of practice may become second nature. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
A.1 INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERATE MEMORIES FOR SAD MOOD INDUCTIONS 
In the coming experiment we are interested in how mood affects responses on tasks. To do this 
research, we will ask you to allow yourself to experience a temporary sad mood. 
To help with this, we ask that in the space below, you describe one of the worst times in 
your life, when you felt very sad or depressed. We are specifically looking for a situation in 
which you felt really bad about yourself, for example, because you could have been at least 
partially at fault, or in which you felt guilty, inadequate, worthless, hopeless, or like a bad 
person. Please do not choose an experience in which you felt guilty for someone's death or 
attempted suicide. On a scale of 1 (neutral) to 9 (extremely sad), we ask that you try to pick an 
experience that you would rate as at least a 7. 
We will ask you to read this during the experiment and to try to feel as you felt at that 
time, so please try to pick an experience that is vivid enough that you will be able to re-create 
your mood. Please describe it in a way that will allow you to recreate this mood during the study. 
Describe the event clearly and in detail. Please describe your thoughts and feelings at the time of 
the event. 
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A.2 MUSICAL SELECTIONS FOR SAD MOOD INDUCTION 
"Adagio" (Albinoni) 
"Drive Home (from Field of Dreams Soundtrack)" (Horner) 
"Russia Under the Mongolian Sky" (Prokofiev) 
"Adagio" (Barber) 
A.3 MUSICAL SELECTIONS FOR HAPPY MOOD INDUCTION 
"Baroque and Blue" (Bolling & Rampal) 
"This Old Train" (Cushnie) 
"Nuns for Nixon" (Fleck) 
"Agolo" (Kidjo) 
"Kumnandi" (Lasser) 
"Asturian Way" (Flook) 
"Plekete" (Zap Mama) 
"Signe" (Clapton) 
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A.4 INSTRUCTIONS TO SELECT SELF-RELEVANT DYSFUNCTIONAL 
THOUGHTS 
Listed below are a variety of thoughts that pop into people's heads. Please read each thought and 
indicate, when you are in a sad mood, how sad would that thought would make you feel? 
Think about recent sad moods, not necessarily when you were depressed. On the right hand side 
of the page, write the appropriate answers in the following fashion: 1 = "no more sad", 2 = "a 
little more sad", 3 = "moderately more sad", 4 = "quite a bit more sad", and 5 = "extremely more 
sad" 
A.5 INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERATE MEMORY FOR HAPPY MOOD INDUCTION 
In the coming experiment we are interested in how mood affects responses to different tasks. To 
do this research we will ask you to allow yourself to experience a temporary happy mood. 
To help with this, we ask that in the space below, you describe an extremely happy 
personal experience. That is, we are asking you to describe one of the best times in your life, 
when you felt happy or exuberant. On a scale of 1 (neutral) to 9 (extremely happy) we ask that 
you try to pick an experience you would rate as at least a 7. 
During the study we will ask you to read this script and try to feel as you felt at that time, 
so please try to pick an experience that is vivid enough that you will be able to re-create your 
mood. Please describe it in a way that will allow you to re-create this mood during the study. 
Please describe the event clearly and in detail. Please describe your thoughts and feelings at the 
time of the event. 
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A.6 INSTRUCTIONS FOR LABORATORY TASK, NATURALISTIC BLOCK 
When you see each sentence, think about the sentence, as if it were a thought that popped into 
your head. So, in your mind, deal with the thought in whatever way YOU NORMALLY 
WOULD if it popped into your head. 
Now, whenever you find yourself getting off-task or distracted, press the space bar to 
continue to the next sentence. 
Remember, deal with each thought in whatever way YOU NORMALLY WOULD if it 
popped into your head. There is no right or wrong way. 
Sentences will be repeated. And when this happens, please deal with them again as new 
thoughts. 
The task will end after 5 minutes. 
A.7 INSTRUCTIONS FOR LABORATORY TASK, REAPPRAISAL BLOCK 
When you see each sentence, think of a REFRAME to each sentence you see, using the skills 
you just learned. Please do the reframe in your head, do NOT type it. It is important you think of 
a reframe for every sentence. 
Once you have thought of a reframe, press space bar to continue to the next sentence. 
Sentences will be repeated. When this happens, make A NEW, DIFFERENT 
REFRAME. To remind you of these instructions, you will see the word REFRAME before each 
sentence. 
The task will end after 5 minutes. 
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Again, sentences will be repeated. Please do ANOTHER DIFFERENT REFRAME when 
this happens. 
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